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Implicit processingThe ability of perspective taking is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. The ability to
decide, what another person can or cannot see is referred to as ‘‘level 1 perspective taking.’’
This is thought to be a process that we can make use of intentionally, but which also takes
place spontaneously. Autism is characterized by impairments of social interaction, which
are thought to be related to deficits in implicit rather than explicit perspective taking. In
order to assess both levels of processing with regard to perspective taking, we employed
an established task in patients and controls. Our results demonstrate that both groups
engage in spontaneous level 1 perspective taking. In contrast to controls, however, patients
reacted more slowly if they had to verify the other’s as compared to their own perspective,
which shows that participants with high-functioning autism have selective difficulties in
explicit, but not implicit, level 1 perspective taking. These findings demonstrate that while
spontaneous level 1 perspective taking appears to be intact in autism, this ability is
impaired in patients when used explicitly.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
To be able to put oneself in the spatial position of an-
other person is assumed to play a crucial role in many
other higher-level processes involved in social cognition.
We take perspectives all the time, and we do so both con-
sciously and unconsciously, both intentionally and sponta-
neously. Children acquire their first perspective taking
skills at the age of seven months (Kovács, Téglás, &
Endress, 2010); even non-human primates, to somedegree, have an understanding of other perspectives (Hare,
Call, & Tomasello, 2001). If a person has problems with per-
spective taking tasks, the inability to take the perspective
of someone else is often due to ‘‘natural egocentrism’’
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1956) and an inability to ‘‘decenter’’
or, in other words, to perform a perspective shift from
the first person perspective to a third person perspective.
Usually, however, humans cannot ignore others’ visuospa-
tial perspectives and even take them spontaneously (Sam-
son, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010).
Persons suffering from autism spectrum disorders (ASD),
however, experience disturbances in social interactions
(Schilbach et al., 2013) that are associated with deficits in
the ability to access others’ mental states and in spatial
perspective taking (Frith, 1996). In this paper we study
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(HFA) spontaneously adopt others’ perspectives.
The available literature distinguishes between different
types of perspective taking. On the one hand there are pure
perceptual forms of perspective taking (Newcombe, 1989),
referring to the capacity to imagine how others perceive
the world, here research focuses on visuospatial perspec-
tive taking processes. The most famous visuospatial per-
spective taking task is the three mountains experiment
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1956) in which children have to decide
what a landscape looks like from another person’s point of
view. On the other hand, the term ‘‘perspective taking’’ is
also used to indicate the capacity to ascribe mental states
(e.g. judgments, thoughts, beliefs, feelings, emotions, de-
sires etc.) to other persons, also referred to as ‘‘mentaliz-
ing’’ or ‘‘theory of mind’’ processes (Frith & Frith, 2006).
In a well-known mentalizing task, namely the Sally-Anne
task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), children have to
decide where an agent Sally will search for a marble that
was moved elsewhere (by Anne) while the agent Sally
was absent. To which degree visuospatial perspective tak-
ing and mentalizing are based on functionally similar or
independent processes is still an open question (David
et al., 2008; Kockler et al., 2010), but we can assume that
the ability of visuospatial perspective taking plays an
important role for the ability of mentalizing (Frith & Frith,
2006).
In our study we focus on visuospatial perspective taking
processes. Research distinguishes between ‘‘level 1’’ and
‘‘level 2’’ perspective taking (Flavell, Abrahams Everett,
Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Michelon & Zacks, 2006): Taking
the visuospatial level 1 perspective of another person re-
quires responding adequately to the question of what the
target person can and cannot see or, for example, whether
a certain object is visible from the other’s perspective. In
contrast, level 2 perspective taking addresses the question
of how the target person perceives the world, or how an ob-
ject appears from the other’s perspective, as is illustrated
in the three mountains problem.
In level 1 perspective taking tasks, participants usually
have to judge what another person is able to perceive in
comparison to their own perceptions (Michelon & Zacks,
2006; Vogeley et al., 2004). As an example, Vogeley et al.
(2004) presented static visual stimuli with a virtual charac-
ter standing in the center of a room with several red balls
placed around him. The scene was presented from differ-
ent viewpoints and participants had to judge the number
of balls as seen by the virtual character or by themselves.
When participants had to judge from the other’s perspec-
tive, reaction times increased and neural activation was in-
creased in brain areas recruited during spatial cognition
including the precuneus, the right superior parietal and
the right premotor cortices. Samson et al. (2010) used sim-
ilar stimuli to investigate the spontaneous nature of per-
spective taking in healthy controls under systematic
manipulation of the consistency between the participant’s
and the other’s perspectives. The underlying idea is that
any perspective that is taken spontaneously or even auto-
matically will interfere with the perspective that people
are asked to take intentionally, provided that the perspec-
tives differ from one another. In their scenes, participantsalways had the same view on the virtual character. Instead
of balls, discs were located on only two of the room’s walls
so that they were either in front of or behind the virtual
character. Participants were presented with a number
and had to verify whether the number corresponded to
the number of discs as seen from either their own or the
other’s perspective. Samson et al. (2010) found an effect
of ‘‘egocentric intrusions’’: The verification of the other’s
perspective was more difficult if participants saw a differ-
ent number of discs than the virtual character, suggesting
that one’s own perspective has to be disengaged to verify
the perspective of the other person. Crucially, however,
they also found an effect of so-called ‘‘altercentric intru-
sions’’: It was more difficult for participants to verify the
number of discs seen from their own perspective if the vir-
tual character saw a different number of discs. This effect
shows that the level 1 perspective of the virtual character
is taken spontaneously, even if it goes against ostensible
task demands. These results suggest that level 1 perspec-
tive taking is a spontaneous, pre-reflective process.
Autistic persons have difficulties with social interaction
and with taking others’ perspectives (Baron-Cohen, 1988;
Frith, 1996). Interestingly, while they have difficulties with
mentalizing tasks and also with level 2 perspective taking
tasks (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009), they do not ap-
pear to have any problems with level 1 perspective taking
(for a recent overview on visuospatial perspective taking in
ASD, see Pearson, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2013). For example,
adult HFA participants are able to decide which of two ob-
jects appears at an elevated position with respect to a vir-
tual character as quickly and as accurately as control
participants do (David et al., 2010). Even autistic children
show no difference to controls when they have to position
a doll to make it ‘‘see’’ a specific object or when they have
to indicate what a doll or an experimenter can ‘‘see’’ from
its viewpoint (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Hobson, 1984; Leekam,
Baron-Cohen, Perrett, Milders, & Brown, 1997; Leslie &
Frith, 1988; Reed & Peterson, 1990). As described above,
non-autistic participants cannot ignore the visuospatial
perspectives of other persons and take them spontane-
ously (Belopolsky, Olivers, & Theeuwes, 2008; Frischen,
Loach, & Tipper, 2009; Samson et al., 2010; Tversky & Hard,
2009; Zwickel, 2009; Zwickel, White, Coniston, Senju, &
Frith, 2011). In this study, we wanted to investigate
whether individuals with HFA, who are generally able to
take others’ visuospatial level 1 perspectives, also process
them spontaneously, or whether they can only refer to
others’ perspectives in a controlled, intentional way. This
objective was motivated by demonstrations of a dissocia-
tion between impaired implicit and relatively intact
explicit levels of social cognition in high-functioning
autism (Schilbach, Eickhoff, Cieslik, Kuzmanovic, & Vogeley,
2012; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009).
To test these different levels of processing in autistic
and control persons, we used a level 1 perspective taking
task that differentiates between intentional and spontane-
ous perspective taking (Samson et al., 2010). To measure
intentional perspective taking, participants were explicitly
asked to take their own or someone else’s perspective. To
address spontaneous perspective taking, we measured
the degree of interference between the explicitly requested
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study, thereby, constitutes the first attempt at examining
intentional and spontaneous visuospatial perspective taking
in individuals with HFA within the same task. According to
the literature, we expect participants with HFA to have no
difficulties with intentional visuospatial level 1 perspective
taking (Baron-Cohen, 1989; David et al., 2010; Hobson,
1984; Leekam et al., 1997; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Reed &
Peterson, 1990). On the contrary, we expect to find evidence
for impairments of spontaneous perspective taking consis-
tent with findings that indicate difficulties with implicit
belief reasoning (Senju et al., 2010, 2009) and an absence
of the spontaneous integration of directional gaze cues pro-
vided in a stimulus–response compatibility paradigm
(Schilbach et al., 2012). For control participants, we expect
to replicate the results found by Samson et al. (2010).2. Method
2.1. Participants
Thirty-one participants were studied and received a
small honorarium for their participation. The diagnostic
group comprised 16 HFA participants (7 female, 9 male)
aged 29–54 years old. All had been diagnosed with Asper-
ger syndrome (AS). Fifteen of them were recruited at the
autism outpatient clinic at the Department of Psychiatry
of the University of Cologne and one at the Autism Therapy
Center Cologne. They were compared to 15 control partici-
pants (11 female, 4 male) 29–53 years of age who were
matched with respect to age, gender, handedness and years
of education (see Table 1). Control participants did not re-
port a history of neurological or psychiatric disease. They
were recruited locally, mostly through on-campus adver-
tisement. The study was approved by the local ethics com-
mittee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Cologne,
and participants gave written consent before taking part.
The AS diagnoseswere based on two independent physi-
cians who explored the autistic traits in clinical interviews
according to ICD-10 criteria supplemented by an extensive
neuropsychological assessment and diagnosed Asperger
syndrome. We use the more general term HFA to describe
the clinical group with AS, because research does not pro-
vide differences between the two (Frith & de Vignemont,
2005). The term HFA refers to patients with ASD who have
a high intellectual level of functioning anddoes not take into
account diagnostic criteria relating to early childhood.
Participants were screened with the Autism Spectrum
Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin,Table 1
Demographic and neuropsychological variables.
HFA
Age M = 44.0, SD = 7.1
Gender 7 female, 9 male
Handedness 15 right-handers, 1 left-hander
Years of education M = 16.9, SD = 4.1
AQ M = 41.6, SD = 3.6
BDI M = 14.1, SD = 9.2
HFA HFA group, CON control group, M mean, SD standard deviation, AQ Autism& Clubley, 2001). As expected, the HFA group showed a sig-
nificantly higher score than the control group. As depres-
sion is a common co-morbidity in HFA (Stewart, Barnard,
Pearson, Hasan, & O’Brien, 2006), we tested the presence
of a depressive syndrome with the Beck Depression Inven-
tory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987; Hautzinger, Bailer, Worall, &
Keller, 1995) and found significantly higher scores in the
HFA group as compared to the control group. Demographic
and neuropsychological variables for both groups are listed
in Table 1.
2.2. Materials
The stimuli showed virtual scenes of a room with three
visible walls (see Fig. 1) as used in Samson et al. (2010). A
virtual character was located in the centre of this virtual
room, always at the same position, facing either the right
or the left wall. A number of red discs (0, 1, 2, or 3 discs)
were located on these two walls – either on one or on both
of them. The virtual character’s gender was the same as the
participant’s gender.
2.3. Design and procedure
Weused the same procedure as Samson et al. (2010) and
added the factor (diagnostic) Group (HFA vs. Control) to the
design. The experiment had a 2  2  2 design with Per-
spective (Self vs. Other) and Consistency (Consistent vs. Incon-
sistent) as within-participants factors and Group as
between-participants factor. The Perspective factor had
two levels: In the Self condition participants had to verify
their own perspective, whereas in the Other condition they
had to verify the virtual character’s perspective. The Consis-
tency factor differentiated the Consistent condition, with
scenes in which participant and virtual character saw the
same number of discs, and the Inconsistent condition, where
they saw a different number of discs. The Group factor com-
pared participants with HFA with Control participants.
In each trial participants first saw a fixation cross fol-
lowed by the German words for ‘‘YOU’’ (‘‘DU’’) or ‘‘HE’’/
’’SHE’’ (‘‘ER’’/’’SIE’’) indicating whose perspective partici-
pants had to verify. Then they saw a digit between 0 and
3 that indicated the number of discs that had to be verified.
These three screens were presented for 750 ms each with a
500 ms time window in between. Finally, the scene ap-
peared and participants had to verify as quickly as possible
if the given number of discs was seen from the requested
perspective via mouse button press. The position of the
mouse depended on the handedness of the participants,CON
M = 42.9, SD = 8.8 n.s.
11 female, 4 male n.s.
14 right-handers, 1 left-hander n.s.
M = 18.1, SD = 3.7 n.s.
M = 13.9, SD = 3.9 p < .001
M = 3.9, SD = 3.2 p < .001
Spectrum Quotient, BDI Beck Depression Inventory.
Fig. 1. Example stimuli (taken from: Samson et al., 2010).
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a ‘‘yes’’-response. Reaction times and error rates were mea-
sured. As soon as a response was given, or after a maxi-
mum of 2000 ms, the scene disappeared and the next
trial started.
The experiment consisted of 26 practice trials and 208
test trials. In 96 of the test trials participants had to give
a ‘‘yes’’-response (matching trials); the other 96 were fill-
ers and required a ‘‘no’’-response (non-matching trials).
Sixteen additional fillers without any discs in the scene
were used, so the number zero also required a ‘‘yes’’-re-
sponse in some trials. The conditions were equally dis-
persed not only among the matching trials, but also
among the additional fillers (including matching and
non-matching trials) and non-matching trials.
Out of the 96 matching trials, in 48 trials participants
saw the same number of discs as the virtual character
(Consistent condition). Therefore, all discs had to be located
on the wall the virtual character was looking at. In the
other 48 trials the virtual character saw fewer discs than
the participant (Inconsistent condition), because one or
more of them was located on the wall behind the virtual
character. In 24 trials of each condition (Consistent vs.
Inconsistent), participants had to verify their own perspec-
tive (Self condition); in 24 trials they had to verify the vir-
tual character’s perspective (Other condition).
The trials were presented in four blocks with 52 trials
each and preceded by the practice block. The block order
was counterbalanced across participants. The trials within
the blocks were pseudo-randomized and fixed across par-
ticipants to keep the procedure as close as possible to the
original study by Samson et al. (2010).
Participants sat down in front of a computer screen and
read the printed standardized instructions. After the partic-
ipants had finished reading, the experimenter asked if they
understood the task and had further questions. Then the
experiment was started. The stimuli were presented with
DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003). The experiment started
with a practice block which took about three minutes. As
all participants performed well, the four experimental
blocks were started afterwards. Each block lasted about six
minutes and the whole experiment took about 30 minutes.3. Results
We conducted a 2  2  2 repeated measure analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on the matching trials only with thewithin participant factors Perspective (Self vs. Other) and
Consistency (Consistent vs. Inconsistent) and the between
participants factor Group (HFA vs. Control). We ran separate
analyses for the two dependent variables reaction time
(RT) and error rate (ER). Note that Perspective relates to
intentional perspective taking: An effect of Perspective
means that one perspective is intentionally more difficult
to take than the other. Consistency relates to spontaneous
perspective taking: An effect of Consistency means that
inconsistent perspectives yield a different (higher) RT/error
rate than consistent ones, which in turn indicates that an
inconsistent perspective that is not explicitly probed inter-
feres with the one that is explicitly probed.3.1. Reaction times
Reaction times are depicted in Fig. 2. All trials that were
either interrupted by timeout (0.5% of the data) or that
were not answered correctly (6.5% of the data) were elim-
inated from the data set when we analysed reaction times
as a dependent variable. The ANOVA did not reveal a main
effect of Group, F(1, 29) < 1, p = .36, g2p ¼ :03, so there was
no overall reaction time difference between HFA partici-
pants (M = 807 ms) and Control participants (M = 747 ms).
We found a main effect of Perspective, F(1, 29) = 7.45,
p < .05, g2p ¼ :20, where participants were significantly
faster when verifying their own (M = 758 ms) as compared
to the virtual character’s perspective (M = 796 ms).
Furthermore, we found an interaction between Perspective
and Group, F(1, 29) = 6.48, p < .05, g2p ¼ :18. Pairwise
comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that only
HFA participants showed a significant Perspective effect,
F(1, 29) = 14.38, p < .005, with reaction times being signif-
icantly slower when they were asked to verify the virtual
character’s perspective (M = 844 ms), as compared to when
asked to verify their own perspective (M = 770 ms). The
effect of Perspective was not significant for Control
participants (the effect of Group was also not significant,
neither in the Self condition nor in the Other condition).
Intrusions of one’s own perspective onto the other’s
were shown in the highly significant main effect of Consis-
tency, F(1, 29) = 56.71, p < .001, g2p ¼ :66, in that reaction
times were slower if the virtual character and the partici-
pant saw a different (M = 825 ms) rather than the same
number of discs (M = 729 ms). There was no interaction
of Consistency and Group, F(1, 29) < 1, p = .80, g2p ¼ :002,
and the effect of Consistency held for HFA, F(1,
Fig. 2. Reaction times for both diagnostic groups, judging either the number of discs seen by oneself or by the other (virtual character), whereby these
perspectives could either be consistent or not. Error bars represent two standard error deviations.
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ipants, F(1, 29) = 25.63, p < .001, g2p ¼ :47.
Differences between egocentric and altercentric intru-
sions were evidenced by a highly significant interaction
between Consistency and Perspective, F(1, 29) = 29.64,
p < .001, g2p ¼ :51. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni cor-
rected) showed that the Perspective effect was limited to
the Inconsistent condition only, F(1, 29) = 18.23, p < .001,
in that only when perspectives did not match were partic-
ipants slower to verify the virtual character’s perspective
(M = 869 ms) compared to their own (M = 781 ms). When
the perspectives were congruent, there was no difference
in judging perspectives. The Consistency effect held for both
the Self and Other conditions, with participants slower to
verify if perspectives were inconsistent, although an incon-
sistent own perspective interfered more on Other trials
(egocentric intrusion; 146 ms slower; F(1, 29) = 56.84,
p < .001) than an inconsistent virtual character perspective
did on Self trials (altercentric intrusion; 48 ms slower; F(1,
29) = 19.18, p < .001). We found no three-way-interaction
between Perspective, Consistency and Group, F(1, 29) < 1,
p = .84, g2p ¼ :001. The interaction between Perspective
and Consistency held independently for HFA, F(1,
15) = 13.72, p < .005, g2p ¼ :48, as well as for Control partic-
ipants, F(1, 14) = 18.41, p < .005, g2p ¼ :57. Also, both alter-
centric and egocentric intrusions were present in both
groups. HFA participants showed the effect of Consistency
in the Self, as well as in the Other condition, though some-
what stronger in the latter (F(1, 15) = 10.12, p < .01, and
F(1, 15) = 22.08, p < .001, respectively); Control participants
likewise showed the effect for Self and Other, also some-
what stronger in the latter (F(1, 14) = 9.09, p < .01, and
F(1, 14) = 50.50, p < .001, respectively).
3.2. Error rates
In a second ANOVA we looked at error rate as the
dependent variable; the results are depicted in Fig. 3. Wedidn’t find a main effect of Group, F(1, 29) < 1, p = .81,
g2p ¼ :002. HFA participants (M = 6.7% errors) and Control
participants (M = 6.2% errors) did not differ in the accuracy
of their responses.
We found a significant main effect of Perspective, F(1,
29) = 11.53, p < .005, g2p ¼ :29. In line with the RT analysis,
participants made more errors if they had to verify the vir-
tual character’s perspective (M = 8.9% errors), as compared
to their own perspective (M = 4.0% errors). Unlike for RTs,
we did not find an interaction between Perspective and
Group, F(1, 29) = 2.49, p = .13, g2p ¼ :08, although, like for
the RTs, the effect of Perspective held only for HFA partici-
pants, F(1, 29) = 12.65, p < .001, g2p ¼ :30, and not for the
Control group, F(1, 29) = 1.65, p=.21, g2p ¼ :05 (again, the ef-
fect of Group was neither significant in the Self condition
nor in the Other condition).
There was a highly significant main effect of Consis-
tency, F(1, 29) = 26.13, p < .001, g2p ¼ :47, in that, in line
with the RT analysis, participants made more errors if they
saw a different number of discs than the virtual character
(M = 10.9% errors) than if they saw the same number
(M = 3.0% errors). As with the RTs, we found no interaction
of Consistency and Group, F(1, 29) < 1, p = .67, g2p ¼ :01, and
the effect of Consistency held for HFA, F(1, 29) = 15.04,
p < .005, g2p ¼ :34, as well as for Control participants, F(1,
29) = 9.90, p < .005, g2p ¼ :25.
The analysis also showed an interaction between Con-
sistency and Perspective, F(1, 29) = 6.28, p < .05, g2p ¼ :18.
Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) again showed
the Perspective effect to be limited to the Inconsistent con-
dition, F(1, 29) = 9.74, p < .005; participants were less accu-
rate in verifying the virtual character’s perspective
(M = 14.7% errors) than their own (M = 6.3% errors) for tri-
als in which perspectives differed. We didn’t find a Perspec-
tive effect in the Consistent condition. Again, the effect of
Consistency held both for Self and Other conditions.
Participants were less accurate in the verification if
perspectives were inconsistent, although an inconsistent
Fig. 3. Error rates for both participant groups, judging either the number of discs seen by oneself or by the other (virtual character), whereby these
perspectives could either be consistent or not. Error bars represent two standard error deviations. (Although the error bar is large for ‘‘HFA other-
inconsistent,’’ there were no systematic outliers in that all participants understood the task, and none seemed to perform generally worse across multiple
sub-conditions. Hence, the error bar represents a genuine heterogeneity within the HFA population with respect to degree of interference of the own
perspective on the judgment of the perspective of the virtual character.)
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intrusion; 11.5% error increase; F(1, 29) = 16.39, p < .001),
than an inconsistent virtual character perspective did on
Self trials, (altercentric intrusion; 4.5% error increase; F(1,
29) = 19.51, p < .001). Again, there was no three-way-inter-
action between Consistency, Perspective and Group, F(1,
29) = 3.30, p = .08, g2p ¼ :10. However, the interaction be-
tween Perspective and Consistency held only for HFA, F(1,
15) = 6.49, p < .05, g2p ¼ :30, and not for Control partici-
pants, F(1, 14) < 1, p = .50, g2p ¼ :03. Also, both altercentric
and egocentric intrusions were present in both groups.
HFA participants showed the effect of Consistency in the Self
as well as in the Other condition, although somewhat
stronger in the former (F(1, 15) = 12.51, p < .005, and F(1,
15) = 8.52, p < .05, respectively); Control participants like-
wise showed the effect for Self and Other (F(1, 14) = 10.58,
p < .01, and F(1, 14) = 12.71, p < .005, respectively).3.3. Ruling out task switching effects
Because we use a pseudo-randomized trial sequence in-
stead of a blocked sequence, it is, in principle, possible that
the judgment of the virtual character’s perspective in one
trial might be responsible for altercentric intrusions in
the judgment of one’s own perspective in the next trial
or vice versa (see Samson et al., 2010). In order to exclude
the possibility that the egocentric and especially altercen-
tric intrusion effects were due to task switching effects
between current and previous trials, we coded each trial
in terms of the number of similar (same perspective
judgment) or dissimilar (different perspective judgment)
trials that preceded it. This led to roughly 25% of trials
being preceded by just one similar trial and another 25%
being preceded by two or more similar trials. Analogously,roughly 25% of the trials were preceded by just one dissim-
ilar trial and 25% by two or more dissimilar trials. We
re-ran our ANOVA with Priming as an additional within-
participants factor with two levels (Similar Primed vs.
Dissimilar Primed). The analysis showed no main effect of
Priming, and, more importantly, not a single significant
interaction of Priming with any of our previously observed
main and two-way interaction effects, and this for reaction
times as well as error rates (.07 < p < .92). This shows that
alter- and egocentric intrusions are not simply due to
activation of the ‘‘intruding’’ perspective by the previous
dissimilar trial in half of the experimental trials.
4. Discussion
Contrary to what could be expected from the literature
on implicit impairments in autism, the data show that HFA
participants take level 1 perspectives of others spontane-
ously, similarly to healthy control participants, as evi-
denced by longer reaction times and increased error rates
when judging one’s own perspective in the presence of
someone with a different perspective. Despite intact spon-
taneous perspective taking, persons with HFA appear to
have difficulties when asked to intentionally take another’s
perspective that is not the same as their own, as indicated
by longer reaction times and higher error rates. This latter
effect, which did not present itself for control participants,
is suggestive of a dissociation between implicit and explicit
visuospatial level 1 perspective taking in HFA.
4.1. HFA participants take others’ perspectives spontaneously
Spontaneous perspective taking was measured by the
degree to which inconsistent perspectives interfere with
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found the same Consistency main effect as Samson et al.
(2010), demonstrating that the verification of a perspective
is more difficult for participants if other’s and own
perspective are inconsistent. This was due to both ‘‘egocen-
tric’’ and ‘‘altercentric intrusions.’’ As expected, partici-
pants’ own perspective interfered with verification of
that of the other, reflecting spontaneous ‘‘egocentric
intrusions.’’ Crucially, both control participants and HFA
participants spontaneously take the level 1 perspectives
of others in that the verification of one’s own perspective
is influenced by the other’s perspective, reflecting ‘‘
altercentric intrusions.’’ The importance of this finding is
that it shows, for the first time, intact level 1 perspective
taking measured implicitly, where taking the other’s
perspective goes against task demands.
Like Samson et al. (2010), we also found that when per-
spectives differ, the own perspective interferes more with
verification of the other’s than vice versa, reflected in an
interaction of Perspective and Consistency, with the Consis-
tency effect being less pronounced on Self trials than on
Other trials. Importantly, the Consistency effect held both
for the Self and Other conditions, and the absence of a
three-way-interaction with Group as well as post hoc tests
show that that these effects do not differ between HFA and
Control participants. Thus, we replicated the results of
Samson et al. (2010) for both diagnostic groups studied
here.
This is a surprising result because persons suffering
from ASD are known to have problems with many similar
tasks and need to mobilize conscious cognitive effort to
solve them (Hamilton et al., 2009; Schilbach et al., 2012;
Senju et al., 2009). It is well-known, that patients with
ASD show high accuracy in level 1 perspective taking tasks
(Baron-Cohen, 1989; David et al., 2010; Leekam et al.,
1997; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Reed & Peterson, 1990; Hobson,
1984), but these tasks have not been used before to test
whether level 1 perspective taking also occurs spontane-
ously. Our data clearly demonstrate that this is the case.
Other studies show diverse findings regarding implicit pro-
cesses relevant for social cognition in participants with
ASD. For example, persons with ASD also track the tasks
of other persons automatically (Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf,
& Prinz, 2005), but children with ASD don’t show an impli-
cit false belief understanding as control children do (Senju
et al., 2009, 2010). These diverse results on processing dif-
ferences evident in other studies as well as our finding that
participants with HFA adopt level 1 perspectives spontane-
ously can be seen as support for the idea that different cog-
nitive processes may underlie level 1 perspective taking on
the one hand and the processing of level 2 perspectives and
higher level perspectives referring to social cognitive pro-
cesses such as mentalizing on the other hand (Hamilton
et al., 2009).
4.2. Problems with intentional perspective taking
Interestingly, despite the fact that altercentric intru-
sions on verification of the own perspective show that per-
sons with HFA spontaneously take the other’s perspective,
they nevertheless have markedly slower reaction timesand make more errors when they are explicitly asked to
take the other’s perspective. Intentional perspective taking,
whereby participants are asked to judge their own or the
other’s perspective, is reflected in the factor Perspective.
We found a main effect of Perspective, showing that it is
easier for participants to verify their own perspective as
compared to the virtual character’s perspective. For Per-
spective, the interaction between Perspective and Consis-
tency differed from the one found by Samson et al. (2010)
in that we found the Perspective effect to be limited to
the Inconsistent condition, meaning participants only had
more difficulty verifying the other’s perspective as com-
pared to their own when the perspectives differed. Samson
et al. (2010) in contrast found a Perspective effect limited
only to the Consistent condition suggesting instead a ten-
dency for the verification of the other’s perspective to be
easier as compared to their own when the perspectives
didn’t conflict. We did not find such an effect, but did see
the same trend in Control participants.
Crucially however, we found an interaction between
Perspective and Group with respect to RT: Here only HFA
participants showed a significant Perspective effect – which
pairwise comparisons also confirmed for error rates. Their
reaction times were significantly slower and their error
rates higher when they verified the virtual character’s per-
spective as compared to their own. This result is different
from earlier studies showing no evidence that persons
with ASD have difficulties reporting on others’ level 1 per-
spectives (Baron-Cohen, 1989; David et al., 2010; Hobson,
1984; Leekam et al., 1997; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Reed &
Peterson, 1990). The crucial difference to these studies is
that in our study participants have to take the perspectives
under time pressure.
As both diagnostic groups have more difficulties verify-
ing the others’ compared to their own perspectives in the
Inconsistent condition, people seem to have particular diffi-
culty ignoring their own perspective. The HFA group had
more difficulty with the perspective of the other, irrespec-
tive of the consistency of both perspectives. Samson et al.
(2010) argue that under specific constraints basic compu-
tational processes allow implicit access on others’ mental
states and avoid the demand of explicit, conscious and
effortful processes. As control persons as well as autistic
persons track perspectives of others spontaneously, level
1 perspective taking seems to belong, at least partially, to
the implicit processes of social cognition (Frith & Frith,
2008). The apparent inconsistencies between spontaneous
and intentional perspective taking, specifically for judg-
ments of others’ perspectives, can be explained if sponta-
neous and intentional level 1 perspective taking need
processes that operate independently from each other,
making the spontaneous activation of the other’s perspec-
tive not necessarily available for intentional, explicit use.
Indeed, explicit processes need not be informed or related
to their implicit counterparts; for instance, it has been sug-
gested that there might be two systems to track beliefs
that cause differing results when perspective taking is
measured implicitly compared to explicitly (Apperly &
Butterfill, 2009; Surtees, Butterfill, & Apperly, 2012). Simi-
larly, implicit measures of Theory of Mind in a false belief
task (such as gaze) need not inform explicit measures
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in combination with the above mentioned finding that
without time pressure, people with HFA can take others’
perspective explicitly, this suggests that for HFA partici-
pants, explicit perspective taking takes more cognitive ef-
fort than for control participants.
This in turn could mean that, given the explicit instruc-
tion to take a perspective, HFA participants engage in an
effortful explicit process notwithstanding their capacity
at implicit perspective taking, whereas control partici-
pants, when explicitly asked to judge the other’s perspec-
tive, may still rely more on less time-consuming implicit
processes. Thus, if participants with HFA are explicitly
asked to take a perspective, a specific explicit process
might be activated and inhibit the implicit components,
as they intentionally try to solve the task differently than
other people do and consequently have greater difficulties
with the task. This could be an unconscious process or an
explicit strategy, although the response had to be given un-
der time-pressure. In the Self-condition this process or
strategy is not needed, which is why we don’t find a differ-
ence here.
Alternatively, it could be that for the intentional task
both control and HFA participants engage in a more delib-
erate, top-down process at which HFA participants are spe-
cifically impaired, leading to more errors or requiring more
time. In the next section, we suggest that this top-down
process might be intentional attention shifting.
4.3. Perspective taking as a shift of attention
In light of the present HFA group data, it is difficult to
uphold the notion that level 1 perspective taking is gov-
erned by one single process, and the most likely impaired
process would be one that is recruited not just in explicit
perspective taking, but more so in explicit judgments of
the other’s than of the own perspective. When we take
the perspective of another person and move away from
our egocentric view, we have to shift our attention from
our own perspective to the perspective of the other, and
possibly also the reverse. Therefore, we propose that an
intentional perspective shift is a voluntary, top-down
attention shift from one perspective to another. This is con-
sistent with findings showing that taxing executive control
in a visuospatial perspective taking task increases the
interference between the own and the other’s perspective
(Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010). As it is unlikely that
participant’s attention in our experiment lies on the other’s
perspective for longer than a trial lasts, top-down attention
shifts are always needed when participants have to verify
the other’s perspective. Indeed, the absence of task switch-
ing effects shows that by the start of a new trial, the effects
of the previous trial’s perspective have dissipated. What
we suggest is that, even if the other’s perspective is always
spontaneously activated, the top-down attentional focus
lies on the own perspective by default, because this is, after
all, in fact what we actually see. Thus, if people explicitly
want to take another person’s perspective, they voluntarily
shift their attention from their own default perspective to
the other’s perspective. When participants judge their
own perspective and other-perspective taking is measuredimplicitly, they are not explicitly asked to shift perspec-
tives, and given altercentric intrusions we can assume
the other’s perspective was processed without voluntarily
attending to it. It is known that persons with ASD have
difficulties with attention shifts (Courchesne et al., 1994;
Allen & Courchesne, 2001; Townsend & Westerfield, 2010)
and related to these impairments other findings suggest
differences in the top-down control of attention in individ-
uals with HFA (Greenaway & Plaisted, 2005; Loth, Gómez,
& Happé, 2008, 2010). A possible interpretation of our data
would be that persons with ASD might have problems dis-
engaging from and suppressing their own perspective
when they have to verify the perspective of another per-
son. As the ability of individuals with ASD to shift attention
only seems to be impaired when they are under time pres-
sure (Allen & Courchesne, 2001; Courchesne et al., 1994),
the time pressure in our paradigm could explain why we
found that individuals with HFA have problems with
intentional level 1 perspective taking that other studies
did not find. This could explain their accurate responses
with surprisingly high reaction times in our study’s
conditions in which they had to intentionally shift their
attention and perspective from their own to the other’s
view of the scene.
4.4. Limitations and future research
While the results suggest that intrusions of the other’s
perspective are not simply due to task-switching costs
when people have to evaluate their own perspective after
having rated the other’s on a previous trial, there remains
a possibility that the overall task set was at least partly
responsible for the activation of the other’s perspective.
In the task we used, the demand to verify in each block
both the own and the other’s perspective in an alternating
manner could have triggered participants to explicitly acti-
vate the other’s perspective, knowing that it will be rele-
vant in some trials. In the light of HFA participants’
difficulty on the explicit task, it seems rather unlikely that
such explicit activation enhances implicit performance
while attenuating explicit performance, but it remains a
possibility. Samson et al. (2010) excluded this explanation
by additionally testing the own and the other perspective
in separate blocks. When presenting the Self trials in a first
block and the Other trials in a second block, participants
weren’t aware that the other’s perspective would become
relevant for the task at one point. This blocked testing con-
firmed the spontaneity of the perspective taking process,
and whereas we assume that this doesn’t differ in persons
with HFA, this assumption needs to be confirmed in further
work.
In addition, as people are unable to suppress this per-
spective even if it harms their performance, the data speak
in favor of not only spontaneous but also automatic activa-
tion of the other’s perspective. Nonetheless, this remains to
be tested, since at no point are participants asked to ac-
tively suppress the other’s perspective.
Whereas we propose that the HFA group has problems
with top-down attention shifts away from their own per-
spective when explicitly asked to do so, this remains a
hypothesis based on the present data. While the current
S. Schwarzkopf et al. / Cognition 131 (2014) 345–354 353data speak in favor of two processes underlying implicit
and explicit perspective taking, the question whether
attention really plays a role remains to be explored. But
at least the process underlying explicit judgments then
would have to be selectively recruited for Other as com-
pared to Self judgments. More specifically, future research
will have to show if the problems persons with HFA have
with intentional level 1 perspective taking are caused by
the difficulties they have shifting attention. If level 1 per-
spective taking really is a (social) shift of attention, it will
be important to show if the impairments persons with
HFA have with other types of perspective taking and with
mentalizing, relate to their problems shifting attention.
Qureshi et al. (2010) suggest that effortful control, such
as a top-down attention shift, is needed both for shifts
from the own to the other’s perspective and shifts from
the other to the own perspective. While this may be the
case, the fact that persons with HFA only seem to have
problems rating the other’s perspective suggests that top-
down attention shifts are either more crucial for shifts
away from the own perspective, or that persons with
HFA have specific difficulties with shift away from the
own perspective. This also needs to be explored further.
Another question to be addressed in the future is how
level 1 perspective taking, level 2 perspective taking and
mentalizing processes – both on an implicit as compared
to an explicit level – are related to each other, whether
they depend on each other or whether they refer to the
same underlying cognitive processes. It is well known that
performance in these processes ranges widely – to under-
stand this diversity and the origin of the problems persons
with HFA have, it is important to understand the underly-
ing processes that play a role for these tasks and how they
differ from each other. Here, it is important to distinguish
whether people with HFA engage in explicit processes
where control participants do not, or whether both engage
in explicit processes, which are specifically impaired in
people with HFA.
Another issue to address is whether level 1 perspective
taking processes rely on the same neural mechanisms in
individuals with HFA and in controls. When non-autistic
individuals mentalize about a similar other, there is activa-
tion in medial prefrontal cortex areas that are also used
during self-referential thoughts (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji,
2006). This finding is consistent with studies showing
identical neural circuits involved in mentalizing about
oneself and others (Lombardo et al., 2009) and also with
our control participants who show the same performance
if they have to verify their own compared to the other’s
perspective and suggests that they are able to resort to
comparatively similar processes, as if there was no differ-
ence between mentalizing about oneself and others. In
contrast, the difference between the own and the other’s
perspective is more relevant in our HFA group. They are
disproportionally faster at verifying their own compared
to the other’s perspective. This finding suggests processing
differences and is in accordance with evidence supporting
the view that different neural processes are involved dur-
ing self-referential cognitive processing in people with
HFA compared to controls (Lombardo & Baron-Cohen,
2011; Lombardo et al., 2010). Thus, it would be interestingto see if the difference between oneself and others in a le-
vel 1 perspective taking task is more pronounced in spe-
cific brain regions in individuals with HFA compared to
controls. Whether the implicit processes, which are com-
parable across diagnostic groups, do or do not rely on the
same neural mechanisms is another issue that could be
addressed by future research.
In conclusion, this paper shows that people with HFA
may have difficulty explicitly solving a task at which they
are good implicitly. Rather than being merely of relevance
for autism research with respect to impairments in implicit
processes, this finding suggests that in persons without
HFA, explicit task performance may on some occasions
be informed by more implicit knowledge, something
which does not seem to be the case in HFA.Acknowledgments
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